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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this time of rapidly escalating prices of branded and 
generic drugs, the primary question on this appeal pertains 
to the adverse impact of such prices not on the consumer 
public, but rather on potential stockholders of a leading 
drug manufacturer. Plaintiff Frank P. Ieradi purchased 
common stock in defendant Mylan Laboratories, Inc. 
(Mylan), in the face of a price investigation being conducted 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The investigation, 
which focused on Mylan's recent increases in the prices of 
fourteen of its drugs, ultimately resulted in the FTC filing a 
complaint in federal district court alleging that Mylan had 
engaged in practices in restraint of trade in violation of the 
Sherman Act. The plaintiff alleges that initiation of the 
action by the FTC, in turn, caused Mylan's stock price to 
drop over three points. 
 
Following this drop in stock price, Ieradi filed a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania claiming that Mylan violated section 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) 
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and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 by 
concealing, in both its press releases and filings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the existence 
of two supply contracts which gave Mylan exclusive access 
to raw materials necessary to produce two of its generic 
anti-anxiety medications. These exclusive contracts enabled 
Mylan to obtain higher prices for drugs and presumably 
greater profits for its stockholders. The complaint also 
charges that the individual officers and directors of Mylan 
are liable for its misconduct because they are control 
persons within the meaning of section 20 of the 1934 Act. 
The District Court dismissed Ieradi's complaint, holding 
that disclosure of the exclusive supply contracts would not 
have significantly altered the total mix of information 
available to the reasonable investor, and that therefore the 
failure to disclose specifically those contracts was not 




Mylan manufactures and markets generic 
pharmaceuticals, including two anti-anxiety medications 
named lorazepam and chlorazepate. The raw materials 
essential to the manufacture of these two drugs are 
produced solely by Profarmaco S.r.l. ("Profarmaco"), an 
Italian company, and distributed in the United States solely 
by Gyma Laboratories of America ("Gyma"). In November of 
1997, Mylan entered into agreements with Profarmaco and 
Gyma that gave it exclusive access to these raw materials 
in the United States for a period of ten years. 
 
Shortly after entering the agreements, Mylan raised its 
prices significantly on fourteen generic drugs, including 
lorazepam and chlorazepate. On January 12, 1998, Mylan 
increased the price of chlorazepate tablets by amounts 
ranging from 1900% to 3200%. On March 3, 1998, Mylan 
raised its prices on lorazepam tablets. These increases 
ranged from 1900% to 2600%. Mylan made the increases, 
although the cost of manufacturing both clorazepam and 
lorazepate remained steady. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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On February 17, 1998, Mylan filed its Form 10-Q with 
the SEC for the quarter ending December 31, 1997. In this 
10-Q, Mylan reported on the existence of an exclusive 
supply and distribution agreement it had entered into with 
a Canadian company, Genpharm, Inc., relating to the sale 
of another drug in the United States. The report, however, 
mentioned nothing about the exclusive contracts with 
Profarmaco and Gyma. 
 
On June 19, 1998, Mylan filed its Form 10-K with the 
SEC for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1998. In that 
filing, the company stated: 
 
       While Mylan anticipates continued benefits from price 
       increases in the near future, the continuation of this 
       trend and any resulting benefits depend on several 
       factors, some of which are beyond the Company's 
       control. 
 
The Form 10-K also reported increases in Mylan's revenues 
and net earnings of 37% and 132%, respectively. 
 
On July 4, 1998, Mylan filed its Form 10-Q with the SEC 
for the quarter ending June 30, 1998. The 10-Q reported 
similar increases with respect to revenues and earnings, 
attributing the significant earnings improvements to overall 
shipment volumes and selective price increases on fourteen 
products implemented during the June 1998 quarter. The 
10-Q then disclosed the existence of an investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). 
 
Specifically, the 10-Q stated: 
 
       As a result of price increases initiated by the Company 
       during the past six months, the Company has received 
       notification from the Federal Trade Commission that it 
       is investigating whether the Company and others have 
       engaged in activities restricting competition in the 
       manufacture or sale of pharmaceutical ingredients or 
       products. The Company is cooperating fully with the 
       review and is providing all the information requested 
       by the Commission. As with all governmental inquiries 
       the process is inherently uncertain. 
 
The 10-Q further reported: 
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       While these price increases have favorably impacted 
       earnings in the current quarter, the extent if any in 
       future quarters depends upon several factors, some of 
       which are beyond the Company's control. During the 
       quarter ended June 30, 1998, the Company received 
       notice that the Federal Trade Commission . . . , in light 
       of the price increases, was investigating whether the 
       Company and others had engaged in activities 
       restricting competition in the manufacture or sale of 
       pharmaceutical ingredients or products. The Company 
       is cooperating fully with this investigation and is 
       supplying the documents requested. Management 
       believes that the Company has acted properly and in 
       full compliance with the Federal Trade Commission Act 
       and all other laws and regulations governing trade and 
       competition in the marketplace. . . . The Company 
       believes the ultimate resolution of this matter will not 
       have a material adverse effect on the Company's 
       financial position or results of operations. 
 
In the "Forward Looking Statements" section of the same 
10-Q, Mylan stated: 
 
       The Company may be unable to realize [its] plans and 
       objectives . . . due to various important factors, 
       including, but not limited to, . . . if the FTC concludes, 
       on the basis of its investigation, that the Company has 
       acted improperly. 
 
On July 6, 1998, the Wall Street Journal reported on 
Mylan's price increases on the fourteen drugs, including 
lorazepam and chlorazepate. Around that time, a Mylan 
spokesperson specifically denied that Mylan had cornered 
the market on certain raw materials needed to manufacture 
these two anti-anxiety medications. However, on or about 
July 20, 1998, Mylan Vice President Patricia Sunseri 
revealed that the FTC had sent a subpoena to the company 
the previous month asking about a series of price increases 
on generic drugs since the prior fall. Sunseri claimed the 
FTC "just wanted to make sure . . . [the price increases] 
w[ere] justified." Still, Mylan made no public reference at 
this time to its contracts with Profarmaco and Gyma. 
 
On October 26, 1998, Ieradi purchased 100 shares of 
Mylan stock at a price of $33-13/16. 
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On December 5, 1998, the public learned that the FTC 
notified Mylan that it was preparing to sue the company, 
alleging that Mylan had raised prices after cornering the 
market on raw materials used to produce anti-anxiety 
drugs. Following this announcement, Mylan's stock price 
dropped from $34-3/8 on Friday, December 4, to $31-5/16 
on Monday, December 7. The FTC subsequently initiated an 
action charging Mylan, Profarmaco, and Gyma with various 
violations of the antitrust laws. The case has since been 
settled, subject to judicial approval. The settlement requires 





Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act broadly prohibits the use of 
"manipulative or deceptive devices" in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security. SEC Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated thereunder, prohibits persons from, inter alia, 
making "any untrue statement of a material fact or 
omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances in 
which they were made, not misleading . . . ." To state a 
claim for securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, 
 
       a private plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) 
       that the defendant made a misrepresentation or 
       omission of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) that the 
       defendant acted with knowledge or recklessness and (5) 
       that the plaintiff reasonably relied on the 
       misrepresentation or omission and (6) consequently 
       suffered damage. . . . Also, because section 10(b) 
       claims sound in fraud, the circumstances constituting 
       the fraud must be stated with particularity. . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We take judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 210(f) of an 
article in the New York Times of July 13, 2000 entitled "Generic Drug 
Maker Agrees to Settlement in Price-Fixing Case." See United States v. 
Poszgai, 999 F.2d 719, 731 (3d Cir. 1993)(appellate court may take 
judicial notice of a matter not before the District Court); See also 
Peters 
v. Delaware River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (3d Cir. 
1994)(appellate court may take judicial notice of newspaper articles). 
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       [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b) requires a plaintiff 
       to plead (1) a specific false representation of material 
       fact; (2) knowledge by the person who made it of its 
       falsity; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to 
       whom it was made; (4) the intention that it should be 
       acted upon; and (5) that the plaintiff acted upon it to 
       his damage. . . . 
 
In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 710 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The plaintiff alleges that defendants, in disregard of their 
duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information to 
public investors of a company whose common stock was 
listed and actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange, 
publicly attributed Mylan's increased revenues primarily to 
continued growth in all product lines when, in fact, the 
Company's success "was primarily possible because of its 
contracts with Profarmaco and Gyma for [the raw materials 
for] lorazepam and chlorazepate." (Para. 35 of Complaint.) 
The plaintiff further alleges that Mylan downplayed the risk 
that the FTC investigation would materialize into a federal 
civil action by specifically denying in its statements to the 
press that it had "cornered the market" on the raw 
materials necessary to produce lorazepam and clorazepate 
and by stating in its SEC filings that the Company believed 
it acted properly in increasing the prices of its drugs. 
 
According to the plaintiff, these statements artificially 
inflated the price of Mylan's common stock because they 
failed adequately to inform investors of the risk that the 
FTC investigation would materialize into a civil action 
directed at the Company's primary source of increased 
revenues. In making this claim, the plaintiff does not 
contend that Mylan was required to provide the investing 
public with a summary of the FTC's case against the 
Company followed by a summary of the Company's defense. 
Nor does he argue that Mylan was required to admit that it 
had monopolized the raw materials market in question. 
Rather, he argues that in commenting on the FTC 
investigation Mylan had a duty to disclose the existence 
and substance of its exclusive supply contracts with 
Profarmco and Gyma so that he and other reasonable 
investors could intelligently assess the risk that the FTC 
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investigation would result in a civil antitrust action against 
Mylan. 
 
As noted above, the District Court held that Mylan's 
failure to disclose specifically the exclusive supply contracts 
was not material because this information would not have 
significantly altered the total mix of information available to 
the reasonable investor. The issue of materiality is a mixed 
question of law and fact. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 
426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). However, because we must 
accept all factual allegations contained in Ieradi's complaint 
as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss, our review 
of the District Court's decision is plenary. See Port Auth. of 
N.Y. and N.J. v. Arcadian Corp., 189 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 
1999); Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1397-98 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 949 (1997). 
 
"The question of materiality . . . is an objective one, 
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented 
fact to a reasonable investor." TSC, 426 U.S. at 445; see 
also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) 
(applying TSC materiality standard to claim under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5). "An omitted fact is material if there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider it important in deciding" how to act. Id. at 449. It 
contemplates "a showing of a substantial likelihood that, 
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the 
reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the `total mix' of information 
made available." Id. 
 
When "alleged misrepresentations or omissions are so 
obviously unimportant to an investor that reasonable 
minds cannot differ on the question of materiality," 
dismissal is warranted. Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 
272, 281 n.11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 934 (1992). 
However, where there is room for differing opinions on the 
issue of materiality, the question should be left for jury 
determination. See Ballan v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., 720 
F. Supp. 241, 249 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). 
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Returning to the case at bar, we see no error in the 
District Court's conclusion that Mylan's failure to disclose 
the existence and substance of the exclusive supply 
contracts was immaterial. First, as Ieradi acknowledges, in 
Mylan's 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30, 1998, the 
Company did disclose that the FTC was investigating 
"whether the Company and others had engaged in activities 
restricting competition in the manufacture or sale of 
pharmaceutical ingredients or products." Moreover, in the 
"Forward Looking Statements" section of the 10-Q, Mylan 
also disclosed that it "may be unable to realize[its] plans 
and objectives . . . if the FTC concludes, on the basis of its 
investigation, that the Company has acted improperly." We 
think this public disclosure was more than sufficient to put 
potential investors such as Ieradi on notice that Mylan's 
alleged anticompetitive activity in raising the prices of its 
drugs, including chorazepate and lorazepam, could subject 
the company to antitrust action by the FTC. 
 
Moreover, we find support for the District Court's 
conclusion that disclosure of the two exclusive contracts 
was immaterial in the action of the stock market that 
followed the FTC investigation. Although the revenues and 
earnings of the company substantially increased, as 
reported in its Form 10-Q for the quarter ending June 30 
1998, the closing stock market price for Mylan common 
stock price fell sharply following the disclosure of the FTC 
investigation into Mylan's anticompetitive activities. After a 
closing high of 35 on July 17, 1998, Mylan's stock price 
declined every successive day thereafter except one, even 
without any information pertaining to the exclusive supply 
contracts, until the close of 25 on August 4, 1998. 3 This 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, we may take judicial notice at 
any stage of the proceeding of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute 
that is capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to a source 
whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. See SEC v. Bilzerian, 
814 F. Supp. 116, 123 n. 10 (D.D.C. 1993); Jack B. Weinstein & 
Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence  S 201.12[8] (Joseph 
McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997). The opening and closing 
stock prices on the New York Stock Exchange for Mylan during the 
period of July 17 to August 4, 1998 are reported by Quotron Chart 
Service. 
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drop of ten points is more than 300 per cent in excess of 
the 3 1/6 point "plummet" that occurred several months 
after the plaintiff purchased stock on October 26, 1998. 
 
Second, we disagree with Ieradi to the extent he argues 
that, with the knowledge of the exclusive supply contracts 
at issue in this litigation, a reasonable investor would have 
been able to assess the risk that the FTC investigation 
would have resulted in the commencement of a civil action. 
As the district court noted, exclusive supply contracts that 
allow a company to raise prices, and thereby increase 
revenue, are usually viewed as advantageous to investors. 
Moreover, although Ieradi does allege that the contracts at 
issue here were anticompetitive and in violation of the 
antitrust laws, we seriously doubt that "the reasonable 
investor" possesses the depth of antitrust law expertise that 
would allow him or her to conclude that the contracts were 
susceptible to successful attack under the antitrust laws. 
Knowledge that the FTC was engaging in an investigation of 
Mylan's extraordinary pricing of its drugs because of its 
anticompetitive activities was much more informative to 
"the reasonable investor" than information pertaining to 
Mylan's exclusive contracts for raw materials for two of its 
drugs. 
 
Armed with information of the FTC investigation into 
Mylan's anticompetitive activities, we believe that Ieradi was 
sufficiently informed on October 26, 1998, the date he 
purchased his Mylan stock, that the Company faced a risk 
of a civil antitrust action. We are further persuaded that 
the disclosure of the exclusive supply contracts at issue in 





Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
committed no error in holding that the non-disclosure of 
the exclusive contracts relating to lorazepam and 
chlorazepate was not a material fact. For the reasons set 
forth above, the order of the District Court will be affirmed. 
Costs taxed against the appellant. 
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